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Abstract: This article is aimed at analysing women’s tribunals from an international law per-
spective. I will first contend that women’s tribunals can play the role of amici curiae in inter-
national or domestic criminal law proceedings, in all cases in which amici curiae intervention 
is admitted by the rules of procedures of international and domestic tribunals. Secondly, I will 
argue that peoples’ and women’s tribunals are expression of democracy in international law, 
where democracy means women’s participation in the relevant processes of reconstruction 
and re-affirmation of social values in a given community. This is a feminist approach to de-
mocracy, which goes beyond “quotas” or formal equality, one of the first achievements of 
feminist movements, to embrace issues of effective participation in decision-making. For this 
purpose, I will focus on, in chronological order, the first women’s tribunal, that is the Interna-
tional Tribunal on Crimes against Women held in Brussels in 1976; on a tribunal whose struc-
ture and outcome resemble the one of an international tribunal, namely the Women’s Interna-
tional War Crimes Tribunal set in Tokyo in 2000; and on three recent tribunals, the Court of 
Conscience in Guatemala, held in 2010, the Women’s Court in Sarajevo of 2015, and the 
World Court of Women in Bangalore convened in December 2015.  
 
 
Introduction 
Violations of women’s rights occur in every country in the world in times of 
peace (e.g. domestic violence, rape, sexual harassment), during or after armed con-
flicts and/or in situations of emergency (natural disasters, refugee flows, etc.), 
where sexual violence, forced marriages, and rapes have proved to be widespread1. 
The reaction of the international community to violence against women both in 
terms of accountability of private actors and States’ responsibility has often been 
insufficient.               
                                                      
1 See, for example, the report of the International Independent Commission of Inquiry on Syria. 
“They came to destroy”: ISIS Crimes Against the Yazidis, A/HRC/32/CRP.2, 15 June 2016.  
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As widely acknowledged, violence against women is a form of gender-based 
discrimination2. Compared to other situations, discrimination on the grounds of sex 
and gender – and sexual orientation3 – have only recently become high priority at 
the international level. As posited by Nussbaum, “brutal and oppressive discrimina-
tion on grounds of race is taken to be unacceptable in the global community; but 
brutal and oppressive discrimination on grounds of sex is often taken to be a legit-
imate expression of cultural differences”4. Therefore, the spectre of impunity is 
haunting where violations of women’s fundamental human rights occur5.  
International law is equipped with legal instruments to counter violations of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, although, as acknowledged by feminist 
lawyers, it has proved to be extremely male-gendered6. In particular, international 
human rights law, international humanitarian law, and international criminal law 
are extremely relevant for our purposes. In the words of one of the judges of the 
International Court of Justice, international human rights law “has been constructed 
on the basis of the imperatives of protection and the superior interest of human be-
ings, irrespective of nationality or political standing or any other situation or cir-
cumstance”7. In a situation of armed conflict, international humanitarian law is ap-
plicable as a corpus of principles and rules aimed at regulating warfare “both by 
restraining belligerents in the conduct of armed hostilities and by protecting those 
who do not take part or no longer take part in hostilities”8. In order to suppress in-
ternational crimes, international criminal law has progressively developed after the 
Second World War, with the purpose to prevent that “the architects of […] inhu-
mane policies”9 find a “safe haven” moving from one State to another one with the 
purpose to avoid criminal prosecution. The prohibition of war crimes, crimes 
against humanity, and genocide – the “most serious crimes” in the Rome Statute 
establishing the International Criminal Court10 – is no longer an issue only pertain-
ing to domestic courts, but it has rather become of interest for the entire interna-
tional community.  
                                                      
2 See, for example, General recommendation no. 19 (1992) Violence against Women, issued by the 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women.  
3 See Article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2000/C 364/01), which 
provides for the first time the case of discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation.  
4 Martha C. Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice, Belknap Press, Cambridge 2006, p. 260.  
5 Sara De Vido, Il tribunale delle donne in Sarajevo: una prospettiva giuridica internazionale tra de-
mocrazia e memoria collettiva, in Venti anni di pace fredda in Bosnia-Erzegovina, a cura di Susanna 
Regazzoni, Silvia Camilotti, Ca’ Foscari, Venezia 2016, pp. 47-70. 
6 See in that respect, Christine Chinkin, Hilary Charlesworth, The Boundaries of International Law, 
Manchester University Press, Manchester 2000.  
7 Antonio Augusto Cançado Trindade, The Access of Individuals to International Justice, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 2011, p. 6. 
8 Antonio Cassese - Paola Gaeta, Cassese’s International Criminal Law, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford 2013, p. 5.  
9 Mary Griffin, Ending the Impunity of Perpetrators of Human Rights Atrocities: A Major Challenge 
for International Law in the 21st Century, in “International Review of the Red Cross”, 2000, pp. 369-
389. 
10 See Article 7 of the Rome Statute.  
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Despite the achievements of international criminal tribunals11, which cannot be 
denied or underestimated, it is true that impunity has not always been averted. The 
reasons might be of a legal nature, since international tribunals suffer from the lim-
its derived from their founding statute, and of a political nature, in all cases in 
which impunity is the product of the unwillingness of the international community 
to “see” and counter severe crimes committed against people and/or against specif-
ic segments of populations, such as indigenous people and, for what is relevant for 
our study, women. Although the majority of peoples’ tribunals have addressed war 
crimes12, peoples’ and women’s tribunals have also tackled violations of human 
rights in times of peace, such as environmental disasters13, the impact of new infra-
structures on local communities14, workers’ rights in industry15, HIV and human 
trafficking affecting women16. 
 
The Reasons: Peoples’ and Women’s Tribunals as a Quest for Justice 
The need to fight impunity and obtain justice for victims of severe violations of 
human rights has determined the affirmation of the so-called “peoples’ tribunals”, 
starting from the famous Bertrand Russell’s Tribunal. Their nature is more of 
councils than courts; they are composed of experts and activists – not necessarily 
legal scholars or lawyers – whose purpose is to examine facts that have occurred in 
a given situation and moment of history according to the testimonies provided by 
the victims, or relatives of direct victims, of severe violations of rights. Among 
peoples’ tribunals, one should also include women’s tribunals, whose aim is to give 
voice to victims of abuses which have often not been investigated and prosecuted 
by the competent (national) authorities. Peoples’ tribunals have only partially been 
analysed by international legal doctrine, and, when they have, usually to deny that 
they can achieve concrete results17. As posited by Carol Smart, the power of law is 
                                                      
11 We are referring here in particular to the International Criminal Court for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY), the International Criminal court for Rwanda (ICTR), and the International Criminal Court 
(ICC).  
12 Andrew Byrnes - Gabrielle Simm, People’s Tribunals, International Law and the Use of Force, in 
“UNSW Law Journal”, 36, 2013, pp. 711-744. See also Iraq, Chechnya tribunal see Emily Haslam, 
Non-Governmental War Crimes Tribunals: A Forgotten Arena of International Criminal Justice?, in 
Essays and Commentary on the European and Conceptual Foundations of Modern International Law, 
eds. Christofer Harding - Chin L. Lim, Kluwer, The Hague 1999, pp. 153-187.  
13 Bhopal, Permanent People’s Tribunal, Permanent Peoples’ Tribunal on Industrial Hazards and 
Human Rights, Bhopal I, Bhopal (October 19-23, 1992); Permanent People’s Tribunal, Bhopal II, 
London (November 28-December 2, 1994).   
14 Permanent People’s Tribunal, Fundamental right, participation of local communities and infrastruc-
tures. From the TAV to the global reality, Turin, Italy (5-8 November 2015).   
15 Permanent Peoples’ Tribunal, Session on Workers’ and Consumers’ Rights in the Garment Indus-
try, Brussels (April 30-May 5, 1998).  
16 37th World Court of Women, Southeast Asia Court of Women on HIV and Human Trafficking, 6 
August 2009 Nusa Dua, Bali. 
17 Robert Cryer, Prosecuting International Crimes, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2005, p. 
51. 
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“not simply in its material effects (judgments) but also in its ability to disqualify 
other knowledges and experiences”18. Non-legal knowledge is considered to be 
“suspect and/or secondary”19. This attitude of legal scholarship has proved to be 
especially true for peoples’ and women’s tribunals. Some legal commentators have 
however traced the origin of these tribunals, found their legitimacy in a quest for 
justice coming from unheard voices, and described personal experiences as experts 
in one of these bodies20.  
In this article, I will start from a short analysis of peoples’ tribunals and of the 
reasons behind their establishment in the 60s. I will agree with the position of a 
commentator21, according to whom it is pointless to debate on their legal nature, 
since it is evident that these tribunals do not possess the legitimacy of international 
tribunals – which derives from the will of States or international organisations – 
but they represent a push from the bottom to pursue justice. Borrowing an analysis 
related to governments, peoples’ and women’s tribunals, promoted by civil society 
organisations, have an internal legitimacy – which means how they are perceived 
by the people subject to it – but not an external legitimacy – which means how they 
are perceived by other international entities22.  
In a second part I will delve into women’s tribunals. There have been many 
women’s tribunals in history, but I have decided to focus on the first, in chronolog-
ical order, experience, the International Tribunal on Crimes against Women held in 
Brussels in 1976, on a tribunal whose structure and outcome resemble an interna-
tional tribunal, the Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal set in Tokyo in 
2000, and on three recent tribunals, namely the Court of Conscience in Guatemala, 
held in 2010, the Women’s Court in Sarajevo of 2015, and the World Court of 
Women in Bangalore convened in December 2015.  
In a third part, I will address the question of whether and to what extent peo-
ples’ and women’s tribunals are relevant for international law. I will first contend 
that women’s tribunals can play the role of amici curiae in international or domes-
                                                      
18 Carol Smart, Feminism and the Power of Law, Routledge, London 1989, p. 11.  
19 Ibid.   
20 Richard K. Falk, Keeping Nuremberg Alive, in International Law: A Contemporary Conception, 
eds. Richard K. Falk et al., Boulder, Westview 1985; ID, Searching for a Jurisprudence of the Con-
science. International Criminal Liability and Humanitarian Intervention, in Human Rights in the 
World Community, eds. Burns H. Weston - Anna Grear, Pennsylvania University Press, Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania 2016; Arthur W. Blaser, How to Advance Human Rights Without Really Trying: An 
Analysis of Nongovernmental Tribunals, in “Human Rights Quarterly”, 14, 1992, pp. 339-370; Chris-
tine Chinkin, Women's International Tribunal on Japanese Military Sexual Slavery, in “American 
Journal of International Law”, 95, 2001, pp. 335-340; Andrew Byrnes - Gabrielle Simm, Internation-
al Peoples’ Tribunals in Asia: Political Theatre, Juridical Farce or Meaningful Intervention?, in 
“Asian Journal of International Law”, 4, 2014, pp. 103-124; Dianne Otto, Impunity in a Different 
Register: People’s Tribunals and Questions of Judgement, Law and Responsibility, in Anti Impunity 
Agenda and Human Rights, eds. Dennis Davis – Karen Engle – Zinaida Miller, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge 2016 forthcoming.  
21 See Dianne Otto, op. cit.  
22 Jean D’Aspremont, Eric De Brabandere, The Complementary Faces of Legitimacy in International 
Law: The Legitimacy of Origin and the Legitimacy of Exercise, in “Fordham International Law Jour-
nal”, 34, 2011, pp. 190-235, p. 193.  
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tic criminal law proceedings, where their intervention is admitted by the rules of 
procedures of international and domestic tribunals. Secondly, I will argue that 
women’s tribunals are an expression of democracy in international law, where de-
mocracy means women’s participation in the relevant processes of reconstruction 
and re-affirmation of social values in a given community. This is a feminist ap-
proach to democracy, which goes beyond “quotas” or formal equality, one of the 
first achievements of feminist movements, to embrace issues of effective participa-
tion in decision-making.  
 
“May this Tribunal Prevent the Crime of Silence”23: The Origins of Peo-
ples’ Tribunals 
The first peoples’ tribunal is considered to be the International War Crimes Tri-
bunal convened in 1966 by the philosophers Bertrand Russell and Jean-Paul Sartre 
(“Russell Tribunal”) with the purpose of investigating alleged violations of interna-
tional law committed by the United States in Vietnam. The first public session took 
place in Stockholm, Sweden, from 2 to 10 May 1967. The second was held in Ros-
kilde, Denmark, from 20 November to 1 December 1967. There was a small public 
hearing in Tokyo, Japan, from 28 to 30 August 1967). In his speech, Russell recog-
nised the limits of the Tribunal:  
We do not represent any State power, nor can we compel the policy-makers responsible for 
crimes against the people of Vietnam to stand accused before us. We lack force majeure. The 
procedures of a trial are impossible to implement24.  
The philosopher however considered these elements as points of strength, in 
particular as elements of independence and impartiality. The Tribunal was formally 
convened by the Bertrand Russell foundation, hence by a non-governmental organ-
isation. As later confirmed by Sartre in his inaugural speech: 
We have not been given a mandate by anyone; but we took the initiative to meet, and we also 
know that nobody could have given us a mandate. It is true that our Tribunal is not an institu-
tion. But, it is not a substitute for any institution already in existence: it is, on the contrary, 
formed out of a void and for a real need […]. The Russell Tribunal believes, on the contrary, 
that its legality comes from both its absolute powerlessness and its universality25.  
Their words are still valid today. The members of the Tribunal were philoso-
phers, professors of different disciplines, writers, lawyers, pacifists, and activists26. 
                                                      
23 Speech by Bertrand Russell to the first meeting of members, from Autobiography (Allen & Unwin, 
London 1969), vol. III, pp. 215-16. 
24 Ibid.  
25 http://raetowest.org/vietnam-war-crimes/russell-vietnam-war-crimes-tribunal-1967.html#v1101-
Sartre.  
26 Wolfgang Abendroth, Doctor of Jurisprudence; Professor of Political Science, Marburg University; 
Gunther Anders, writer and philosopher; Mehmet Ali Aybar, International lawyer; Member of Turk-
ish Parliament; President, Turkish Workers’ Party; James Baldwin, Afro-American novelist and es-
sayist; Lelio Basso, international lawyer; Deputy of Italian Parliament and Member of the Commis-
sion of Foreign Affairs; Professor, Rome University; Simone de Beauvoir, writer and philosopher; 
Lazaro Cardenas, Former President of Mexico; Stokely Carmichael, chairman, Student Non-Violent 
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The report of the Tribunal illustrates the applicable law, and the crimes which the 
United States was charged with. As for the former, the Tribunal refers to the Nu-
remberg statutes, the Genocide Convention adopted in 1948, the Hague Convention 
of 18 October 1907, the Geneva Protocol of 1925 for gases and analogous sub-
stances, the Geneva Conventions of 194927. The United States was charged with 
crimes against peace and war of aggression, war crimes, crimes against humanity, 
and genocide. In the final report, presented by Jean-Paul Sartre, the Tribunal con-
tinued its analysis under international law and affirmed, by unanimity, that the 
United States government committed acts of aggression against Vietnam under in-
ternational law and that it was guilty of the “deliberate, systematic and large-scale 
bombardment of civilian targets, including civilian populations, dwellings, villages, 
dams, dikes, medical establishments, leper colonies, school, churches, pagodas, 
historical and cultural monuments”28. With only one abstention, the government of 
the United States was found guilty of “repeated violations of the sovereignty, neu-
trality and territorial integrity of Cambodia, that it is guilty of attacks against the 
civilian population of a certain number of Cambodian towns and villages”, and 
Australia, New Zealand and South Korea were judged as accomplices of the United 
States.  
After the death of Bertrand Russell in 1970, Lelio Basso, one of the members of 
the Tribunal, was asked by Brazilian exiles to establish a new tribunal. The Tribu-
nal was held in two sessions – the first in Rome, from 30 March to 6 April 1974, 
and the second in Brussels, from 11 to 18 January 1975. The tribunal dealt with re-
pression in Brazil, Chile, and in Latin America. It concluded that Brazilian, Chilean 
and Bolivian authorities were “guilty of serious, repeated and systematic violations 
of human rights,” and that those violations constituted crimes against humanity29. 
Despite sharp criticism, in particular regarding its legitimacy, the Russell Tri-
bunals paved the way for a new form of justice which derives from the peoples 
                                                                                                                                         
Coordinating Committee; Lawrence Daly, General Secretary, National Union of Mineworkers; Vla-
dimir Dedijer, M.A. Oxon., Doctor of Jurisprudence; historian; Dave Dellinger, 
American pacifist, Editor; Isaac Deutscher, historian; Haika Grossman, jurist, liberation fighter; 
Gisele Halimi, Paris lawyer; attorney for Djamila Bouhired; author of works on French repression of 
Algeria; Amado Hernandez, Poet Laureate of the Philippines; chairman, Democratic Labor Party; 
Melba Hernandez, Chairman, Cuban Committee for Solidarity with Vietnam; Mahmud Ali Kasuri, 
Senior Advocate, Supreme Court of Pakistan; Sara Lidman, author; Kinju Morikawa, Attorney, Vice-
Chairman, Japan Civil Liberties Union; Carl Oglesby, Past President, Students for a Democratic Soci-
ety; playwright; political essayist; Shoichi Sakata, Professor of Physics, Laurent Schwartz, Professor 
of Mathematics, Paris University; Peter Weiss, playwright.   
27 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 9 December 1948; Con-
vention respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the 
Laws and Customs of War on Land, 18 October 1907; Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War 
of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (Geneva Pro-
tocol), 17 June 1925; Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick 
in Armed Forces in the Field. Geneva, 12 August 1949; Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the 
Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 12 August 1949; 
Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 August 1949; Convention (IV) rela-
tive to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949. 
28 Ibid.  
29 http://dlib.nyu.edu/findingaids/html/tamwag/tam_098/bioghist.html 
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themselves and not from the governments. A Permanent Peoples’ Tribunal was 
eventually founded in Bologna on 24 June 1979. Its works are guided by a statute, 
which defines the number of the members of the Tribunal (minimum 35, maximum 
75), and some rules for its functioning30. As of August 2016, it has held 42 ses-
sions.  
The establishment of these tribunals leaves no doubt as to their legal nature: 
these entities do not have any kind of legitimacy under international law, and, for 
the sake of completeness, it should be acknowledged that they do not even claim it. 
They are composed of experts in different fields, activists, victims; the procedure 
can be similar to the one used in international or domestic courts, but it can also 
significantly differ and, for example, place the victims on the same stage as the 
judges. Decisions are based not only on international law and legal principles, but 
also on conscience, and they might include recommendations or aspirations. The 
decision is non-binding, and it does not imply any criminal conviction31. Since they 
respond to a lack of justice, these tribunals are not conceptualised as “alternatives 
to the official judiciary system but aim to represent a supplement, and are therefore 
complementary to these official systems”32. They correspond, as stressed by two 
authors, to a “desire for law”, to a quest for justice by those who did not have the 
possibility to have their claims listened33. Therefore, they should be understood as 
“a form of practice” that potentially contribute to the work of official tribunals, and 
– most importantly – build solidarity34. 
As outlined by Dianne Otto, lawyer and expert in two women’s tribunals, “to 
my mind, they are patently political projects, trying to sway public opinion by fill-
ing some of the information gaps and silences in public discourse that serve to de-
flect disagreement and vilify dissent”35. Otto has also enucleated three categories of 
legal aspiration. There are tribunals that provide a critical judgment about the fail-
ure of international and domestic institution to prosecute crimes; tribunals whose 
aim is to promote new people’s law emerging from marginalisation; and tribunals 
that promote a transformative change of the entire system of law, encouraging 
shared responsibility and a politics of listening36. Tribunals often go beyond the 
law to embrace new ways to conceptualise justice.  
Given the above, one might ask whether the fact that these tribunals have not 
been established by an international treaty or a United Nations Security Council 
Resolution, and that their decisions are non-binding, prevent these bodies from 
having an impact on international law. In this article I will argue that they do have 
an impact. 
                                                      
30 http://tribunalepermanentedeipopoli.fondazionebasso.it/tribunale-permanente-dei-popoli/statuto/ 
31 The Tokyo Tribunal, see infra, found the Emperor Hirohito guilty of the crimes committed against 
“comfort women”. 
32 Daša Duhaček, Women’s Court: A Feminist Approach to In/Justice, in Women’s Court: About the 
Process, ed. Staša Zajović, Centre for Women’s Studies, Belgrado 2015, p. 69.   
33 Andrew Byrnes – Gabrielle Simm, Peoples’ Tribunals, cit., p. 743.  
34 Ibid.  
35 Dianne Otto, op.cit.  
36 Ibid. 
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Women’s Tribunals: A Feminist Approach to Justice as of 1976 
Women’s tribunals respond to violations of women’s rights that have occurred 
during and/or after armed conflicts or in times of peace. Compared to peoples’ tri-
bunals, however, women’s courts also respond to the exclusion of women from the 
mechanisms of the peaceful resolution of disputes at the international level37. They 
constitute a “feminist approach to justice”, which allows women to be “agents and 
interpreters of history”38. In other words, women who have been victims of abuses 
participate in these tribunals as witnesses, they recount the facts that occurred in a 
specific moment and place, they also speak about the circumstances and the con-
text of violence, trying to enucleate, thanks also to the support of experts, the caus-
es of violence. Women’s tribunals challenge the persistent discrimination against 
women which is at the very basis of gender-based violence and give women a 
voice.  
The first women’s tribunal was the International Tribunal on Crimes against 
Women, convened in Brussels in 1976 (Brussels Tribunal). The Tribunal was rec-
ommended during a workshop on international feminist strategy held in August 
1974 in Denmark as a critical reaction to the United Nations-declared International 
Women’s Year39. Another international meeting was needed to develop the ideas 
launched in Denmark. Over 600 women therefore met in Frankfurt at the Interna-
tional Feminist Conference of 15-17 November 1974. In the mind of the organis-
ers, there was the Bertrand Russell Tribunal, although nobody expressly mentioned 
it: “I believe some of us had assimilated this event into our consciousness”, re-
ported Diane Russell40. For the purposes of the tribunal, “all man-made forms of 
women’s oppression were seen as crimes against women”41. The crimes included 
forced motherhood, compulsory non-motherhood, persecution of non-virgins and 
unmarried mothers, persecution of lesbians, violence against women (including 
rape and castration of females), crimes perpetrated by the medical profession, eco-
nomic crimes, crimes within the patriarchal family (an innovative aspect at that 
time), oppression of Third World women, of immigrant women, of women from 
religious minorities, sexual objectification of women. Women from 40 countries in 
the world testified violations of women’s rights. There was no jury and any indi-
vidual or group was free to make a proposal. The proposals, such as the legalisation 
of abortion, were presented to the audience but not voted. During the workshops 
that were organised along with the sessions, several proposals were elaborated alt-
                                                      
37 Hilary Charlesworth – Christine Chinkin, op. cit., p. 290. 
38 Staša Zajović, The Women’s Court – A Feminist Approach to Justice: Review of the Process of Or-
ganising of the Women’s Court, in Women’s Court: About the Process, ed. Staša Zajović, Centre for 
Women’s Studies, Women in Black, Belgrade 2015, p. 40. 
39 Diane E.H. Russell - Nicole Van De Ven, Crimes against Women: Proceedings of the International 
Tribunal, Les Femmes, Millbrae 1976, p. 151.  
40 Ibid.  
41 Ivi, p. 152.  
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hough unfortunately the proceedings did not include the minutes42. However, their 
conclusions were brought to the plenary session on the fifth and final day in the 
form of resolutions and proposals for change43. The Tribunal was criticised by the 
participants themselves: a woman invoked a more theoretical analysis and asked to 
reconceive the structure of the tribunal, others complained they had not had time 
enough to present their testimonies. The fact that men were not allowed during the 
sessions was highly controversial and emphasised by the media.   
Despite some weaknesses, the Brussels Tribunal stressed the gravity of several 
crimes against women, and, for the first time in history, it focused on crimes com-
mitted within the family, anticipating a debate which will be high priority in the 
90s at the international level. The purpose was very different from the one of the 
Russell Tribunal: The International Tribunal on Crimes against Women did not as-
sess the responsibility under international law of one State or the other, it did not 
apply international law, it did not prepare a final decision containing recommenda-
tions. Its purpose was not to “judge” but rather to criticise “state-made law”44, 
highly discriminatory against women.  
 
Women’s Tribunals: Following the Path of Remembering   
The International Tribunal on Crimes against Women constituted a “model” for 
subsequent women’s tribunals, having in common the need to hear women whose 
voices had been silenced or never heard by official institutions.  
I will present here some of the tribunals which have marked the evolution of 
these bodies, and I will proceed trying to answer to the following questions: why 
was a tribunal necessary? How was the proceeding – similar or different to the one 
of an international court? Who were the members of the jury? Did they apply inter-
national law? Who were the victims? Which crimes were object of the proceeding? 
What was the outcome of the procedure? 
Tokyo Tribunal on Comfort Women 
The case of “comfort women” represents one of the “silences” of international 
law with regard to sexual violence committed against women during armed con-
flicts. Japanese law prohibited rape committed by the Army and the Navy. During 
the Meiji period, 1868-1912, the perpetrators could face imprisonment or capital 
punishment if the conduct resulted in the death of the victim45. However, during the 
Second World War, in particular in the second half of 1937, the violence of the at-
tacks coming from the coastal areas of Shanghai and Hangzhou and directed at 
                                                      
42 Diane Russell stressed this point, op. cit., p. 12.  
43 Ivi, p. 7.  
44 Dianne Otto, op.cit.  
45 Yuma Totani, Legal Responses to World War II Sexual Violence: The Japanese Experience, in 
Sexual Violence in Conflict Zones, ed. Elizabeth Heineman, Philadelphia University Press, Philadel-
phia 2011, p. 218.  
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Nanking indirectly allowed the devastation of Chinese villages committed by sol-
diers46.   
Whereas the rape of Nanking was prosecuted before the Tokyo tribunal, the 
crimes against “comfort women”, in Japanese jūgun ianfu, women that were re-
cruited, forced to stay in “comfort stations”, and “used” by soldiers during the con-
flict, went unpunished. Women from Korea mainly, but also from China, other 
South-Eastern countries, and even from Japan, were recruited to satisfy military 
sexual desires. It was a system of women trafficking used by the wartime Japanese 
government to cope “with widespread military disciplinary problems”, and to avoid 
other cases of mass rape similar to the one in Nanking47. The involvement of the 
government in the commission of rapes and enforced prostitution was clearly as-
sessed by the Tokyo Tribunal48, which, however, did not examine the responsibility 
of the Imperial government49. 
It was estimated that between 50,000 and 200,000 women had been abused. The 
crimes committed against them had been ignored until 1990, when some organisa-
tions of Korean women presented a request for investigation on the phenomenon to 
the Japanese parliament. The Japanese government denied its involvement, alleg-
ing that the recruitment was organised by private parties50.  
The Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal held in Tokyo, Japan, in 2000 
(Tokyo Tribunal), was hence a response to a silence that had lasted for decades. 
According to Chinkin, a feminist lawyer and one of the experts in the tribunal, the 
trial before the Women’s Tribunal demonstrated that “[w]hen States fail to exercise 
their obligations to ensure justice, civil society can and should step in. To ignore 
violative conduct is to invite its repetition and sustain a culture of impunity”51. 
The composition of the jury – all judges or lawyers52 – might explain why the 
tribunal did resemble a formal court. The case was presented by the “prosecution”, 
                                                      
46 Ivi, p. 219.  
47 Yuma Totani, op. cit., p. 220. Rosa Caroli, Comfort Women. Una lettura di genere, in “DEP. De-
portate, esuli, profughe. Rivista telematica di studi sulla memoria femminile”, 10, 2009, pp. 132-143; 
p. 133. 
48 International Military Tribunal for the Far East, judgment of 4 November 1948, p. 499: “During the 
period of Japanese occupation of Kweilin, they committed all kinds of atrocities such as rape and 
plunder. They recruited women labor on the pretext of establishing factories. They forced the women 
thus recruited into prostitution with Japanese troops”. 
49 Yuma Totani, op. cit., p. 222. See also on the “transformative power of law as a site of memory 
contestation”, Nicola Henry, Memory of an Injustice: The “Comfort Women” and the Legacy of the 
Tokyo Trial, in “Asian Studies Review”, 37, 2013, pp. 362-380.   
50 Rosa Caroli, op. cit., p. 134. Ten cases, starting from 1991, were brought before Japanese courts. 
The plaintiffs were women from different countries, including the Netherlands, alleging the responsi-
bility of the Japanese government and asking for damages. All cases were dismissed. It was only the 
Tokyo District Court, in April 2003, that urged – without however condemning – the Japanese gov-
ernment to initiate dialogues to provide reparation to victims. The decision was eventually overruled 
by the High Court in 2005 (Yuma Totani, op. cit., p. 224). 
51 Christine Chinkin, Women's International Tribunal, op. cit., p. 339. 
52 Judges were Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, former president of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia; Carmen Maria Argibay, a criminal law judge in Argentina and president of 
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composed by teams of different countries, to the judges. Thirty-five survivors gave 
their testimony in Tokyo during the four-day trial, along with the testimony of sev-
eral experts and two former Japanese soldiers, who spoke in front of an audience of 
almost one thousand people. The Japanese government was invited but it did not 
respond. Comfort women came from North and South Korea, the Philippines, Chi-
na, Taiwan, Indonesia, East Timor, Malaysia, including Japan, and the crimes 
committed against women included systematic and widespread rape, sexual slav-
ery, forced abortion, sexual violence, enforced sterilisation and child rape, commit-
ted by the Japanese Imperial soldiers against the former “comfort women” during 
the Second World War. 
 The case was presented in the official way plaintiff v. respondent: “in the mat-
ter of the Prosecutors and the Peoples of the Asia-Pacific Region v. Emperor Hiro-
hito et al. and the Government of Japan”53. The “others” were organs of the Japa-
nese government, such as the War Minister, the Governor General of Taiwan, of-
ficers of the army. The tribunal applied several international conventions, including 
the 1907 Hague Convention, the 1926 Slavery Convention and the 1930 Interna-
tional Labour Organisation Convention on Forced Labour54, along with general 
principles of international law. 
The final decision was called “judgment”, it was structured like a formal deci-
sion taken by an international jurisdiction – with an introduction, the list of the ac-
cused, the narrative of the facts, the merits – and ended with recommendations and 
reparations. The Tribunal declared to sit “as it were a continuation of the Interna-
tional Military Tribunal for the Far East”, established soon after the Second World 
War55. The Tribunal found both that Japan was responsible for violations of inter-
national law (of the jus in bello and of conventions against forced labour and slav-
ery), and that Emperor Hirohito was “guilty of responsibility for rape and sexual 
slavery as a crime against humanity, under Counts 1-2 of the Common Indictment, 
and guilty of rape as a crime against humanity under Count 3 of the Common In-
dictment”56. Therefore, the Tribunal investigated individual and State responsibility 
at the same time: in that respect, it showed a significant difference with interna-
tional tribunals57. The jury also dealt with the issue of immunity of heads of States 
and high-ranking officials: it rejected immunity, arguing that the Nuremberg Tri-
bunal did so even for head of States and that the International Military Tribunal for 
                                                                                                                                         
the International Association of Women Jurists; Dr. Willy Mutunga, a human rights lawyer from 
Kenya; and Christine Chinkin, international lawyer. 
53 Judgment of the Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal available at 
http://www.iccwomen.org/wigjdraft1/Archives/oldWCGJ/tokyo/summary.html 
54 Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations 
concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 18 October 1907. Convention to Suppress the 
Slave Trade and Slavery, 25 September 1926. Convention concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour, 
28 June 1930.  
55 Judgment of the Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal, para.15.  
56 Ibid. Emperor Hirohito died in 1989. 
57 International criminal tribunals assess individual criminal responsibility, whereas other internation-
al courts, such as the International Court of Justice, investigate international State responsibility.  
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the Far East granted immunity “because it was decided to shield the Emperor from 
liability”58. 
The judgment clearly had no legal effect59. The Tribunal recommended that the 
Japanese government made a “full and frank” apology, provided compensation to 
the surviving victims, and established “a mechanism for the thorough investigation 
into the system of military sexual slavery, for public access and historical preserva-
tion of the materials”60. It is interesting that the jury also recommended the estab-
lishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission “that [would] create a histori-
cal record of the gender based crimes committed during the war, transition and oc-
cupation”61. The Tribunal demonstrated the possibility to act as a promoting force 
for change; it built the framework that could have been used for further action to 
“break the history of silence”62.  
Despite its formalism, the Tribunal was also characterised by displays of paint-
ings by victims, messages for peace, photographs of the victims, and was followed 
by a demonstration in the streets of Tokyo63. Furthermore, even though it applied 
international law, the judges identified “the principles of law, human conscience, 
humanity and gender justice” as providing guidance for the Tribunal’s delibera-
tions64. 
Court of Conscience in Guatemala 
In Guatemala, hundreds of women suffered from severe abuses during the con-
flict which lasted almost 40 years, from 1960 to 1996. Discrimination against them 
intersected with discrimination on the ground of ethnic minority. At the end of the 
conflict, the Historical Clarification Commission was established65. Although the 
mandate did not clearly include violence against women, the Commission did deal 
                                                      
58 Judgment of the Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal, para. 73.  
59 See also Sara De Vido, Collective Memory of Rape, in “Sociologia del diritto”, forthcoming. The 
US District court for the District of Columbia also analysed the case of fifteen women under the Alien 
Tort Claims Act (Hwang v. Japan, 172 F. Supp. 2d). However, the then Bush administration support-
ed the Japanese motion to dismiss, alleging that the political question underlying the case precluded 
adjudication. Fifteen years later than the judgment of the women’s tribunal in Tokyo, the Japanese 
Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, offered his apologies to the women in a statement issued in Seoul by his 
foreign minister Fumio Kishida. Japan and South Korea have recently reached an agreement accord-
ing to which Japan will offer to set up a 1 billion yen fund, with the money divided among the 46 
former comfort women still alive, and South Korea in turn will refrain from any further protests at the 
international level. The agreement, not devoid of criticism for women’s associations not being in-
volved in the decision, has at least formally recognised the harm committed against comfort women 
during the Second World War.  
60 Judgment of the Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal, para. 147.  
61 Ibidem. 
62 Judgment of the Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal, para. 1.  
63 Rumi Sakamoto, The Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal on Japan’s Military Sexual 
Slavery: A Legal and Feminist Approach to the ‘Comfort Women’ Issue, in “New Zealand Journal of 
Asian Studies” 3, 2001, pp. 49-58, p. 50. 
64 Dianne Otto, op. cit.  
65Agreement on the establishment of the Commission to clarify past Human Rights violations and acts 
of violence that have caused the Guatemalan population to suffer, 23 June 1994.  
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with gender-based crimes and its final report showed that approximately a quarter 
of the direct victims of human rights violations and acts of violence were women: 
“They were killed, tortured and raped, sometimes because of their ideals and politi-
cal or social participation, sometimes in massacres or other indiscriminate ac-
tions”66. Rape was also considered a “common practice”67. Nonetheless, the as-
sessment of the Commission was not sufficient to end impunity. Truth and recon-
ciliation commissions are extremely useful tools of transitional justice68, generally 
established soon after the conflict by the government itself. Their decisions are 
non-binding. And indeed, of the 1,456 instances of sexual violence registered, only 
285 reached the Guatemalan court system69. In 99 per cent of the cases, violence 
was directed against women and 80 per cent of them were indigenous.  
In 2010, a Court of Conscience took place in Guatemala City, on 4-5 March. 
The quest for the end of impunity was clear: it affirmed a desire for justice. Indige-
nous women witnessed all the abuses they suffered during the conflict, including 
rape, sexual slavery, torture, forced pregnancy, forced marriage with the soldiers 
that raped them, forced sterilisations, forced abortions, and mutilation. The conflict 
ended but that was not the end of violence, since in Guatemala women have con-
tinued to be subjected to physical, psychological, and sexual violence70. Ninety 
eight per cent of femicide cases in Guatemala remain today in impunity. The Court 
was promoted by several non-governmental organisations: the National Union of 
Guatemalan Women (UNAMG), the Community Studies and Psychosocial Action 
Team (ECAP), the National Widows’ Coordinator of Guatemala (CONAVIGUA), 
“Women Transforming the World” (MTM) and La Cuerda, with the support of va-
rious embassies in Guatemala, including those of Costa Rica, France, Germany, 
Norway, Spain and Sweden, as well as United Nations agencies, including the 
United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), the United Nations 
Population Fund (UNFPA), the United Nations Development Fund (UNDP) office 
in Guatemala and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights (UNHCHR). 
The first day, nine women gave their testimonies behind curtains to hide their 
identities; the second day, experts intervened on the causes and effects of violence. 
The “judges of conscience” then issued a statement, which was later signed by 
honoured witnesses. The non-binding statement was divided into three parts: a pre-
                                                      
66 Guatemala Memory of Silence, Report of the Historical Clarification Commission and Concluding 
Observations, 1996, para. 29. https://www.aaas.org/sites/default/files/migrate/uploads/mos_en.pdf 
67 Ivi, para. 91.  
68 With the term “transitional justice”, we identify “the full range of processes and mechanisms asso-
ciated with a societyís attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to 
ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation. These may include both judicial and 
non-judicial mechanisms, with differing levels of international involvement (or none at all) and indi-
vidual prosecutions, reparations, truth-seeking, institutional reform, vetting and dismissals, or a com-
bination thereof”. See The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Socie-
ties, Report of the Secretary-General, 23 August 2004, S/2004/616, para. 8. 
69 http://www.peacewomen.org/content/guatemala-court-conscience-against-sexual-violence-during-
internal-armed-conflict 
70 Ibidem. 
 
 
 
 
 
Sara De Vido DEP n. 33 / 2017 
 
158 
 
amble, the ruling, and recommendations. In the preamble, the judges acknowledged 
that gender-based violence, and in particular sexual violence and violence against 
women and girls, was used as a weapon of war, had reached alarming and unac-
ceptable proportions “para la conciencia humana apegada al ideal de los derochos 
de la humanidad”71. In the decision, the Court declared to be guided by conscience, 
although it referred to domestic law, in particular the Guatemalan criminal code, 
and to international law. It posited that the insurgents violated international human-
itarian law, and international human rights law. The State of Guatemala was found 
in violation of its due diligence obligations to investigate, prevent and prosecute 
crimes, contributing to the creation of a climate of impunity72.The causes of vio-
lence during armed conflict could be traced back to the persistent inequality be-
tween women and men, girls and boys, which anticipated the conflict; the violence 
occurred during the conflict, in turn, worsened the discriminatory situation against 
women and girls in the post-conflict period73. In the statement, with regard to sexu-
al violence committed by members of security forces combined with police and 
military forces during the process of eviction from the occupied territories, the 
judges posited that it amounted to torture according to the Guatemalan criminal 
code74. 
Women’s Court in Sarajevo: A Feminist Approach to Justice  
At the end of 2010, women from almost all countries of the Former Yugoslavia 
started the initiative for the organisation of the Women’s Court, which was held in 
Sarajevo from 7 to 10 May 2015, after dozens of events involving women of dif-
ferent origins.  
With regard to the Women’s Court in Sarajevo, at first sight, one might ask: 
What are the reasons underlying the establishment of the tribunal? Compared to 
other situations and conflicts that have occurred at the international level – such as 
the case of “comfort women”75 – the conflict in the former Yugoslavia has been 
object of analysis by several international bodies, which have addressed issues both 
of individual criminal responsibility and of State responsibility76.  
And yet, women coming from different parts of the Former Yugoslavia felt the 
need to tell what had not been heard elsewhere. One of the reasons concerns the 
limited participation of women in international fora, where the future of the Former 
Yugoslavia was about to be decided. Hence, for example, during the negotiations 
                                                      
71 Pronunciamento final. Tribunal de conciencia contra la violencia sexual hacia las mujeres durante 
el conflicto armado interno en Guatemale, 5 March 2010, http://www.ghrc-
usa.org/Resources/2010/tribunal_de_conciencia.htm#pronunciamiento, preamble.  
72 Ivi, para. 7. 
73 Ivi, para. 8.  
74 Ivi, para. 10-11. 
75 One author talked about “stealth conflicts”. Virgil Hawkins, Stealth Conflicts, Ashgate, Aldershot 
2008, p. 187. The author considers that most conflicts remain “undetected”; in other words, these con-
flicts are absent “from the consciousness of the actors”, such as media, academia, politicians, etc.  
76 International Court of Justice, judgment of 26 February 2007, Bosnia c. Serbia, ICJ Reports 2007, 
p. 43.   
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for the Dayton Accords in November 1995, women from Bosnia and Herzegovina 
did not participate; and this occurred notwithstanding the fact that they were used 
as instruments of war with the purpose to humiliate an entire ethnic group through 
acts of violence against its women77. Sexual abuses were hence based both on gen-
der and on ethnicity78. The Dayton Accords, as acknowledged by Charlesworth and 
Chinkin79, did not request the authorities representing the different entities from 
Bosnia and Herzegovina to address the abuses suffered from women and to provide 
adequate compensation. The agreement did not even contemplate any role for 
women in post-conflict reconstruction.  
Shifting to international criminal justice, it should be first observed that the In-
ternational Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia was established by the 
United Nations Security Council two years before the Dayton Accords with the 
purpose of criminally prosecuting alleged authors of severe violations of interna-
tional humanitarian law and of genocide80. In the Statute of the Tribunal, rape is 
considered as a crime against humanity, not as a war crime or genocide. However, 
the jurisprudence of the tribunal, along with the jurisprudence of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), has contributed to the definition of the ele-
ments of the offences of rape and sexual abuse. Hence, for example, in Akayesu, an 
international tribunal – the ICTR – has acknowledged that rape was an element of 
the crime of genocide, according to the Convention for the Prevention and Punish-
ment of the Crime of Genocide adopted in 194881. The International Criminal Tri-
bunal for the Former Yugoslavia has examined several cases of sexual violence and 
rape: in the Furundzija judgment, for example, judges accepted the testimony of a 
sexually abused victim who suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder82. Howev-
er, not all women had the possibilities to receive justice, to get compensation for 
the abuses suffered during the years of the conflict, and after the end of the hostili-
ties as well. Indeed, in the years that preceded the establishment of the Women’s 
Court, women who participated at the several meetings and events organised in 
every region of the Former Yugoslavia stressed that “the Hague Tribunal is the on-
ly institution that deals with war crimes committed in the region of the former Yu-
                                                      
77 Kelly D. Askin, War Crimes against Women, Kluwer, The Hague 1997, p. 264. 
78 Catherine A. MacKinnon, Crimes of War, Crimes of Peace, in “UCLA Women’s Law Journal”, 4, 
1992, pp. 59-86, p. 65.  
79 Hilary Charlesworth - Christine Chinkin, op. cit., p. 291 
80 UN Security Council Resolution no. 827 (1993), establishing the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia. See also Rhonda Copelon, Toward Accountability for Violence Against 
Women in War: Progress and Challenges, in Sexual Violence in Conflict Zones, ed. Elizabeth Heine-
man, Philadelphia: University Press of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia 2011, p. 242. Sharon A. Healey, 
Prosecuting Rape under the Statute of the War Crimes Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, in 
“Brooklyn Journal of International Law”, 21, 1995, pp. 327-383., p. 327. 
81 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Trial Chamber, 2 September 1998, Prosecutor v. 
Akayesu, case n. 96-4-T. 
82  International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugloslavia, Trial Chamber, 10 December 1998, 
Prosecutor v. Furundžija, case no. IT-95-17/1-T, para. 109. For a detailed analysis of cases of vio-
lence against women analysed by the Tribunal, Nicola Henry War and Rape. Law, Memory and Jus-
tice, Routledge, London 2011. 
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goslavia and that it is often the only instrument that serves justice”83. Furthermore, 
female victims of violence highlighted that, in the case of the most recent verdicts 
passed by the Hague Tribunal, “the State that had organised the crime (Serbia) has 
been granted amnesty”84. The recent Seselj case, which ended in March 2016 with 
the acquittal of the accused85 – charged, among others, with sexual violence – has 
reinforced distrust towards the ICTY. 
Among the reasons for organising the Women’s Court in Sarajevo, women 
mentioned “to make the continuity of violence against women committed in peace 
and in war visible”, “to give voice to individual experiences of women and to in-
clude women’s experience in public memory”, and to acknowledge the victims’ 
sufferings, to establish the facts and “to put pressure on community and the institu-
tional system”, but also to empower women and to create a network of internation-
al women’s solidarity, and to prevent future crimes in order to create the conditions 
for peace for future generations86. 
The Women’s Court was held in Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, from 7 to 
10 May 2015. Organised by the Mothers of the Enclaves of Srebrenica and Zepa 
Foundation, Centre for Women’s Studies, Centre for Women War Victims, Kosovo 
Women’s Network, National Council for Gender Equality, Anima, Women’s Lob-
by, Women’s Studies and Women in Black87, the Court was more a process than a 
proceeding in the sense that it was anticipated by dozens of activities organised in 
different parts of the former Yugoslavia to raise awareness of the importance of 
such an experience for women.  
The judges of the World Court heard witnesses regarding ethnic-based violence, 
which includes institutional violence (such as expulsion from work because of mi-
nority ethnic background, and forced identity changes based on ethnically motivat-
ed hate), repression of the society, in particular the rejection and the harassment of 
ethnically mixed families or marriages; “militaristic violence”, which means the 
war against civilians and repression because of the resistance to the forced mobili-
sation; the continuity of gender-based violence, which encompasses war crimes of 
rape, male violence against women, and political repression of female human rights 
defenders; economic violence against women, such as privatisation as crime 
against women, and living in a situation of constant economic crisis88. It is clear 
that these categories do not correspond to the usual ones used in international crim-
inal law, and, in this sense, they go beyond international law as it conceived to 
                                                      
83 Staša Zajović, The Women’s Court – A Feminist Approach to Justice: Review of the Process of Or-
ganizing of the Women’s Court”, in Women’s Court: About the Process, eds. Staša Zajović et al., 
Centre for Women’s Studies, Women in Black, Belgrade 2015, p. 23.  
84 Staša Zajović, op. cit., p. 24.  
85 International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugloslavia, 31 March 2016, Le procureur c. Seselj, 
case no. IT-03-67-T. “A comprehensively bad judgment”, according to one scholar. 
(http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-sorry-acquittal-of-vojislav-seselj/#more-14187). 
86 Stasa Zajovic, op. cit., pp. 26-27.  
87 Women in black coordinated the entire project. On the experience of Women in Black in Belgrad, 
see Silvia Camilotti, Le Donne in Nero si raccontano. Scritti di Marianita De Ambrogio, Staša Zajo-
vić e Lepa Mladjenović, in “Deportate, esuli, profughe”, 15, 2001, pp. 261-292.  
88 http://www.zenskisud.org/en/o-zenskom-sudu.html 
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break the walls – which are limitations established in order to protect legal princi-
ples such as the rule of law and the nullum crimen, nulla poe-
na sine praevia lege poenali – that prevent international bodies from investigating 
all possible abuses against women  
The World Court was structured into two bodies: the first one was the judicial 
council, composed of seven female members89; the second body had a consultative 
role90. The Court was supported by experts who provided the social and historic 
framework in which the crimes had been committed. The session was held in a the-
atre with more than 600 people attending; on the stage, there were, on one side, the 
witnesses (36 in total), on the other one, the experts. People talked to the audience 
from a lectern. There were no accused to judge.  
After listening to the testimonies of the witnesses participating to the proceed-
ings for two days, on 10 May the judicial council adopted some preliminary deci-
sions and recommendations91, waiting for a more “comprehensive and conclusive 
judgment” which is not available at the time of writing92. In the preliminary deci-
sion, the members of the judicial council reported the crimes against women com-
mitted during and after the conflict in the Former Yugoslavia. They were divided 
into five thematic crimes: the crime against the civilian population, the crime of us-
ing women’s bodies as battlefield, the crime of militaristic violence, the crime of 
persecution of those who are different in war and in peace, the crime of social and 
economic violence. The members then affirmed that: 
All these acts are crimes against peace and violations of human rights, in and of themselves. 
Many of these acts also constitute the crime of genocide perpetrated by Serbia against the 
non-Serb populations. Further, the acts are also evidence of crimes against humanity commit-
ted by all parties to the conflict, including militias93.  
The important contribution given by international law scholars, Dianne Otto and 
Kristen Campbell, is clearly detectable in these sentences, where the council posit-
ed that the acts reported by the witnesses amounted to crimes against peace, a vio-
lation of human rights, genocide, crimes against peace. The judicial council found 
that “all participants to the conflict” were responsible for the abuses suffered by 
women during and after the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, including “all the 
States in the Balkan region”, religious institutions, war profiteers, but also – and 
                                                      
89 Vesna Rakic-Vodinelic (Belgrade, Serbia); Charlotte Bunch (Centre for Women’s Global Leader-
ship. Rutgers university, USA; Kirsten Campbell (Goldsmiths college, London, UK); Gorana Mli-
narevic (activist and feminist researcher, Sarajevo); Dianne Otto (Melbourne Law School); Latinka 
Perovic (Institute for the history of Serbia); Vesna Terselic (Documenta, Zagreb, Croatia).  
90 Marta Drury, nominated as one of the 1000 Women for Peace for the Nobel Peace Prize; Monika 
Hauser (Switzerland, Germany), physician gynecologist and humanitarian; Mariemme H. Lucas, Al-
gerian sociologist living in France.  
91 Judicial Council, Preliminary Decisions and Recommendations, available in English here 
https://research.gold.ac.uk/17965/1/Women's%20Court%20Preliminary%20Decision%20Judicial%20
Council%2009%2005%202015.pdf 
92 Judicial Council, Preliminary Decisions and Recommendations, p. 1. 
93 Ibidem. 
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this is highly significant – “the international community which failed to protect 
those under its care”94.  
The report concludes with some recommendations, including a call for the pub-
lication and dissemination of the history that was presented by the witnesses and of 
the five years of preparation for the Women’s Court. One can also find some inter-
esting elements of international law. First, in the report, States are required to “re-
spect, protect and fulfil” – according to a well-known formula in international hu-
man rights law95 – the human rights of women, “including the right to work, to 
equal and regular pay, to paid maternity and parental leave, to adequate housing, 
social security and health care, including reproductive and sexual rights. The par-
ticular impact on women of unpaid and invisible care work should be recognised 
and remunerated”96. Secondly, States “have a due diligence responsibility for 
providing women with justice and working to end all forms of violence against 
women and human rights abuses in war, as well as ‘peace time’”97. Thirdly, States 
must guarantee compensation and redress, in particular “transformative repara-
tions”, to ensure more than simple monetary support98. Fourthly, States and other 
social institutions, both private and public, which include schools, media, families, 
religious entities, “all share in responsibility for ending the patriarchal, heteronor-
mative and militaristic attitudes that perpetuate and feed all forms of violence and 
discrimination against women”99.  
The judicial council has thus reiterated international legal obligations deriving 
from treaty law and international customs.  
A World Court of Women “against War, for Peace” 
The World Courts of Women started in 1992 as an initiative promoted by two 
non-governmental organisations networks, the Asian Women’s Rights Association 
and El Taller international. The two founder were Corinne Kumar (India) and Nelia 
Sanchez (Philippines).  Over 40 Courts have been established in Asia, the Middle 
East, South-Eastern Europe, Africa, Latin America and the US100. The goals are 
similar to the ones pursued by the International Tribunal on Crimes against Wom-
en, in the sense that they “protest violence against women, not as an individual 
crime, but as embedded in other systemic forms of violence”101. World courts of 
women focus on “testimonies of protest and survival, not just suffering and pain, 
which are linked to a politics of collective responsibility”102. Accordingly, they 
                                                      
94 Ibidem. 
95 See, among others, Olivier De Schutter, International human rights law, 2nd ed. Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, Cambridge 2014, p. 280.  
96 Judicial Council, Preliminary Decisions and Recommendations, p. 7, para. 3. 
97 Ivi, para. 5. 
98 Ivi, para. 6. 
99 Ivi, para. 7.  
100 See, recently, the World Court of Women on Poverty in the US, summer 2012, 
https://worldcourtsofwomen.wordpress.com/  
101 Dianne Otto, op. cit.  
102 Ibidem. 
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might not even refer to specific episodes in history, and they can address violence 
that has occurred in different countries of the world. In the words of Rebecca John-
son, one of the experts in the World Court of Women held in Bangalore (India): 
“The World Courts of Women are important platforms for restoring and amplifying 
voices that have been silenced by oppression, poverty, violence and denial of hu-
man rights and education”103.  
The World Court of Women in Bangalore (Court in Bangalore) was convened 
in November 2015 under the title “against War, for Peace”. It was hosted by the 
Mount Carmel College and Vimochana Women’s Rights Forum, and held in con-
junction with the global conference of the Women in Black, an international net-
work founded in Jerusalem in 1987. The jury, which defined itself as the “Council 
of Wise Women”, was composed of eight experts104, who heard the testimonies of 
dozens of women coming from different parts of the world. As reported by John-
son, some witnesses decided to reveal their identity, other preferred anonymity; 
they talked about painful experiences, the struggle for survival, and the injustices 
suffered. Hence, for example, Radha Paudel, gave testimony about the efforts of 
the Madhes movement to create a dialogue with the government in order to counter 
human rights abuses and corrupt practices; whereas an Iraqi scholar, Eman Kham-
mas, spoke about survival during Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship and then the US-
UK invasion of 2003105. Sessions in Bangalore were held all day long; they includ-
ed oral witnesses along with dance, poetry and short films. The final session fo-
cused on building resistance, peace and justice in a “gathering of spirit”. Violations 
of women’s rights ranged from cultural and ethnic genocide to mass unemploy-
ment and eradication of livelihoods, but also daily violence on the margins of soci-
ety. 
The jury prepared an oral response, which was read in Bangalore on 16 No-
vember 2015. The report draws its conclusions from the testimonies heard over 
several days. As for the perpetrators of violence, the report included several actors, 
such as international institutions (the World Bank, the International Monetary 
Fund, the United Nations), and economic and military structures (stock-markets, 
banks and the economic system, the “military-industrial systems and alliances, 
dominated by the US and NATO”), but also “men hiding behind progressive or-
ganisations, political parties and NGOs”106. With regard to the UN, the witnesses 
blamed “impunity for officials and military forces who harass and violate women, 
including so-called “peace-keepers”. This is an extremely sensitive issue; despite 
the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution no. 1325 (2000), which empha-
sised the role of women as agents of change and peace and the impact of conflicts 
on women and girls, violence is still widespread. In a recent report published by 
                                                      
103 Rebecca Johnson, World Courts of Women: Against War, for Peace, 25 January 2016, 
https://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/rebecca-johnson/courts-of-women-resisting-violence-and-war 
104Rebecca Johnson (UK), Kamla Bhasin (India), Ritu Dewan (India), Marguerite Waller (USA), Lui-
sa Morgantini (Italy), Rose Dzuvichu (India), Elahe Amani (Iran/USA), Lisa Suhair Majaj (Palestine).  
105 Rebecca Johnson, op. cit.  
106 Ibidem.  
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UN Women, guided by the then Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, 
Radhira Coomaraswamy, experts acknowledged that: 
perpetrators must be held accountable and justice must be transformative. Perpetrators of 
grave crimes against women should be held accountable for their actions so that women re-
ceive justice and future crimes are deterred. At the same time, justice in conflict and post-
conflict settings must be transformative in nature, addressing not only the singular violation 
experienced by women, but also the underlying inequalities which render women and girls 
vulnerable during times of conflict and which inform the consequences of the human rights 
violations they experience. The Global Study explores both the importance of fighting impu-
nity for crimes against women through criminal justice proceedings, while also recognising 
the central role played by reparations, truth and reconciliation processes and in ensuring that 
victims and their communities heal and recover together107. 
According to the Court in Bangalore, the origins of historical, futuristic, eco-
nomic, state, political and military violence must be traced in “dominant patriar-
chal, colonialist, neo-liberal institutions, mindsets and practices”; in other words, it 
is a form of violence well eradicated in society.  
The decision of the jury generally referred to rape and crimes against humanity 
and genocide, but without mentioning the relevant legal instruments; furthermore, 
it did not assess individual criminal responsibility. It is evident that, when the tri-
bunal concludes “from women’s perspective, when we see hundreds of thousands 
of refugees desperately fleeing out of Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and many other 
conflict-torn countries we understand this too as genocide”, this not a legal analy-
sis. The purpose of the Court was not to delve into international criminal law, in-
deed, but rather to share responsibility, through the testimonies heard during the 
proceedings, “for stopping these genocides and crimes against humanity”108. The 
experts sitting in the Court in Bangalore were convinced of the fact that “oppres-
sive national and globalised systems of patriarchal beliefs and practices must be 
dismantled, abandoned and destroyed”109.  
The recommendations of the jury were aspirational and inspiring, but highly 
improbable, at least legally speaking, in particular where the jury demanded “that 
we go to the roots. And that we all hold accountable those who own, control, run, 
enable, govern, manage, implement and benefit from all forms of violence”, and 
where it considered that the best way to bring justice is “to build a powerful global 
women’s movement to transform this world into one that is more just, peaceful, 
sustainable and secure”110. As correctly said: 
their aspirations are avowedly utopian, working towards the transformation of the entire sys-
tem of law as we know it, which is seen as deeply complicit in maintaining injustice. At the 
heart of their transformative vision is the idea that we, the people, share the responsibility for 
injustice and need to find ways to acknowledge and act on it111. 
                                                      
107 UN Women, Preventing Conflicts, Transforming Justice, Securing Peace, 2015, pp. 148-149. 
http://wps.unwomen.org/~/media/files/un%20women/wps/highlights/unw-global-study-1325-
2015.pdf 
108 Ivi.  
109 Ivi.  
110 Ivi. 
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Why are These Tribunals Relevant for International Law? 
From the above analysis, we can draw some conclusions. In terms of structure, 
women’s courts differ a lot. The use of words is indicative of the functions and the 
purpose of the tribunals.  The Women’s Military Tribunal established in Tokyo in 
2001 used, for example, the word “military” to address the failure of the Military 
Tribunals established soon after the Second World War to investigate sexual slav-
ery and rape committed against women. The Court of Conscience evokes the way 
to reach a judgment: not only by applying law – in that case the Guatemalan crimi-
nal code - but also by following conscience.  
As for applicable law, the courts applied international law, along with principles 
deriving from a common sense of justice. Even the Charter of the Women’s Mili-
tary Tribunal established in Tokyo, the most legalistic of the five examples, identi-
fied “the principles of law, human conscience, humanity and gender justice” as 
providing guidance for the Tribunal’s deliberations and it ultimately highlighted 
the question of the international community’s moral responsibility for the abuses 
suffered by women. The courts examined in the previous pages aimed to fight im-
punity, to assess individual criminal and State responsibility, to share responsibility 
and to go beyond the law. They shared a common belief, that something could have 
been done beyond the action of governments and international organisations, and 
that something could have changed.  
It should be acknowledged that these tribunals had never had immediate con-
crete consequences112. Nonetheless, the situation both in Tokyo and in Guatemala 
changed some years after the decisions of the tribunals.  As for the situation of 
comfort women, fifteen years after the judgment, the Japanese Prime Minister, 
Shinzo Abe, offered his apologies to the women in a statement issued in Seoul by 
his foreign minister Fumio Kishida. Japan and South Korea have recently reached 
an agreement according to which Japan will offer to set up a 1 billion yen fund, 
with the money divided among the 46 former comfort women still alive, and South 
Korea in turn will refrain from any further protests at the international level113. The 
agreement, not devoid of criticism in the opinion of women’s associations who 
were not involved in the decision, has at least formally recognised the harm com-
mitted against comfort women during the Second World War.  
As for Guatemala, on 26 February 2016, the Supreme Court sentenced two for-
mer military members, former Lieutenant Coronel Esteelmer Reyes and former 
Military Commissioner Heriberto Valdez Asij, to prison terms of 120 and 240 
years, respectively, for crimes against humanity. They were charged with sexual 
slavery against fifteen Indigenous Q'eqchi' Mayan women of Sepur Zarco, who 
were forced to become sex slaves for members of Guatemala’s military during the 
country’s long civil war114. It was the first time that a Guatemalan court had prose-
cuted a case of sexual violence related to the internal armed conflict of that country 
                                                      
112 Robert Cryer, op. cit., p. 51. 
113 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/28/korean-comfort-women-agreement-triumph-
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and it was also the first time that a case of wartime domestic and sexual slavery had 
been prosecuted before a domestic court115.  
A cause-and-effect relationship cannot be proved. I am not arguing that these 
women’s tribunals did directly determine a change, that they induced States to ne-
gotiate, or that they convinced national judges to prosecute alleged perpetrators. 
Nonetheless, the women’s tribunals convened in Guatemala and in Tokyo contrib-
uted to recording testimonies and to fighting silence and forgetfulness.  
If we look at the experience of women’s tribunals from an international law per-
spective, one might ask: Why are they relevant then? Their judgments are non-
binding, governments – and international organisations – barely acknowledge their 
existence. These tribunals created by civil society cannot sentence the accused or 
oblige a State to compensate the victims116.  
Furthermore, it can be counter-argued that the experience of Truth and Recon-
ciliation Commissions shares some common elements with peoples’ and women’s 
tribunals, and that there is no need to establish other bodies at the international lev-
el. However, at a closer look, Truth and Reconciliation Commissions only share 
some common elements with peoples’ tribunals with regard to the outcome, that is 
a non-binding judgment, and to the fact that they focus on victims rather than on 
alleged perpetrators. Truth and Reconciliation Commissions are, in the words of an 
author:  
ad hoc, autonomous, and victim-centered commission of inquiry set up in and authorised by a 
state for the primary purposes of (1) investigating and reporting on the principal causes and 
consequences of broad and relatively recent patterns of severe violence or repression that oc-
curred in the state during determinate periods of abusive rule or conflict, and (2) making rec-
ommendations for their redress and future prevention.117  
Truth and Reconciliation Commissions examine in detail “the context, causes 
and consequences of mass violence” and constitute a process of “justice from be-
low”118. They are in themselves the expression of the will to look at the past to 
build a future based on transparency and the rule of law. Furthermore, victims can 
report violence without appearing as witnesses during a process119. However, the 
                                                      
115 International Justice Monitor, http://www.ijmonitor.org/guatemala-trials-timeline/ 
116 Richard K. Falk, (Re)imaging Humane Global Governance, Routledge, Abington 2014, p. 76. 
117 Mark Freeman, Truth Commissions and Procedural Fairness, Cambridge University Press, New 
York 2006, p. 18. Using Freeman’s definition, three authors have recorded 33 truth commissions 
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tional: Can Truth Commissions Strengthen Peace Processes?, Kofi Annan Foundation, 2014, p. 1, 
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2014, p. 47.  
119 During criminal trials, defense lawyers usually try to discredit witnesses’ testimony. See Priscilla 
B. Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Transitional Justice and the Challenge of Truth Commissions, 
Routledge, London 2011, p. 147.  
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establishment of truth commissions has not proven to be the magic formula capable 
of healing all the wounds created by a conflict.120 As a matter of fact, being a polit-
ical construction, transitional justice may focus on interests of stability, peace, and 
reconciliation while postponing “the issue of justice for victims until a more politi-
cally acceptable time in the future”121.  
Peoples’ and women’s tribunals are neither political projects nor international 
jurisdictions. They “morally” condemn, they raise awareness of crimes that have 
almost been forgotten, they break the wall of silence and they, most importantly, let 
witnesses speak and be heard.  
From an international law perspective, I will analyse the experience of women’s 
tribunals from two different points of view: first, I will argue that they can play the 
role of amici curiae before international courts and tribunals; secondly, I will con-
tend that people’s tribunals constitute expression of democracy in international 
law122.   
Women’s Tribunals as amici curiae  
When we talk about women’s tribunals, the focus is on remembering wrongdo-
ing, which is essential to justice”123. Tribunals convened by non-governmental or-
ganisations can act beyond the law, and reach the minds and the hearts of those 
who listen to the proceedings. An author interestingly talked about the “politics of 
listening”124. The Brussels Tribunal and the Court in Bangalore did not deal with a 
specific situation, and they did not investigate a specific conflict; they rather ad-
dressed the abuses suffered from women in different parts of the world. The Wom-
en’s Court in Sarajevo was capable of going beyond international justice in order to 
investigate crimes that had been committed before and after the conflict. Perhaps 
the Tokyo Tribunal tried to be as similar as possible to an international tribunal, 
although it also pushed the boundaries of law in rejecting the principle of immunity 
with regard to the Japanese emperor and in judging using both law and conscience.  
Listening is, however, only a part of the process. When the audience and the ju-
ry listen, they also share the events and the feelings of the witnesses. With regard 
to all the tribunals we focused on in the previous pages, the purpose was also to 
promote “shared responsibility of the people to struggle against injustice”. In the 
words of Otto, who was one of the panel members in the Asia-Pacific Regional 
Women’s Hearing on Gender-Based Violence in Conflict, held in December 2012 
in Phnom Penh (Cambodia): 
                                                      
120 See the remarks by Kofi Annan in Challenging the Conventional: Can Truth Commissions 
Strengthen Peace Processes?, 2013, http://www.kofiannanfoundation.org/speeches/can-truth-
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121 Luke Moffett, op.cit., p. 48.  
122 These arguments were first introduced in Sara De Vido, Il Tribunale delle donne, cit., and here 
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123 Sue Campbell, Memory, Reparation, and Relation, in Our Faithfulness to the Past. The Ethics and 
Politics of Memory, ed. Sue Campbell, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2014, p. 105. 
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My responsibility did not end with fulfilling the specific tasks I had assumed as a Panel 
Member in Phnom Penh, which included taking responsibility for the Panel Statement of find-
ings and recommendations. Acquitting these responsibilities was only a start. My location in 
the legal academy gives me particular powers of influence through my teaching and research, 
grants me a privileged platform for dissemination of ideas about justice and the law, and ena-
bles me to tap into many formal networks of power. My personal situation as a feminist and 
queer activist strongly informs my interest in and commitment to change, and links me into 
more marginalised community networks and forms of solidarity. Young’s model of social 
connectedness suggests many ways that I can and must take responsibility for my part in the 
failure to recognise and redress the testimonies of injustice that I witnessed in Phnom Penh. 
Participating in this collection, as part of a critical re-examination of contemporary anti-
impunity discourse and practice, is but one contribution that I am able to make125.  
The decisions taken by people’s tribunals are rarely mentioned by the press, and 
almost never taken into consideration by States. Analysing these bodies from an 
international law perspective, it can be said that women’s tribunals are capable of 
building a memory, which might be useful for further proceedings at both the in-
ternational and domestic level. As we saw, a tribunal in Guatemala finally judged 
the alleged perpetrators of crimes committed against indigenous women. Even 
though the Court of conscience in Guatemala might not have been the reason for 
which a domestic court started the proceedings, it might have helped in remember-
ing and in promoting a desire for law and justice. One of the non-governmental or-
ganisations which promoted the Court of Conscience, the Unión Nacional de Muje-
res Guatemaltecas, was also active during the proceedings before the national 
court, and it hence built a bridge between the two experiences.  
In particular, I am arguing that peoples’ and women’s tribunals can play the role 
of amici curiae, of “friends of the court”, before international courts and tribunals. 
An amicus curiae is, according to the definition given by an International Centre 
for the Settlement of Investment Disputes Tribunal in 2005: 
As the Latin words indicate, a “friend of the court”, and is not a party to the proceeding. Its 
role in other fora and systems has traditionally been that of a non-party. […] [Its] traditional 
role […] is to help the decision maker arrive at its decision by providing the decision maker 
with arguments, perspectives, and expertise that the litigating parties may not provide. […] 
[A]n offer of assistance – an offer that the decision maker is free to accept or reject126.  
A broad definition can also be used. As suggested by an author, we can refer to 
amicus curiae as to “any entity (including States, organs of States and of interna-
tional organisations, and private entities) interested in a trial but not party to it, to 
submit an unsolicited written brief or make an oral statement on a point of law, 
fact, or value before an international court or tribunal”127. We can add that the in-
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tervention by an amicus curiae is not necessarily unsolicited, but can also be re-
quested by the international tribunal itself.  
The rules of procedure of international tribunals usually determine methods and 
forms of submission by amici curiae. For example, a Chamber of the International 
Criminal Court may, at any stage of the proceedings, “invite or grant leave to a 
State, organisation or person to submit, in writing or orally, any observation on any 
issue that the Chamber deems appropriate” (rules 103). These observations can be 
submitted in writing or orally. A written observation submitted must be filed with 
the Registrar, who then will provide copies to the Prosecutor and the defence (rule 
103, para. 3).  
Many non-governmental organisations have submitted reports and briefs to in-
ternational courts and they have contributed to shaping international criminal 
law128, although many amici curiae, as pointed out by a commentator, “have tended 
to be advocates for one side or another rather than neutral and independent friends 
of the court”129.  
It does not seem thus improbable, that international, regional, and domestic 
courts – if the participation of amici curiae is possible according to their own rules 
of procedures – accept and even request amici curiae briefs from peoples’ and 
women’s tribunals, or, better, from the organisations that have promoted the estab-
lishment of the tribunals themselves. The use of such reports would not overcome 
the lack of external legitimacy (as defined in the introductory paragraph) of peo-
ples’ tribunals under international law but they would provide them a formal 
recognition at the international level. It is now necessary that, for the first time in 
history, an international tribunal or a domestic court clearly asks for the testimonies 
collected by one of the numerous peoples’ tribunals that have been established in 
the past years.   
Women’s Tribunals and Democracy 
In this section I contend that women’s tribunals manifest democracy at the in-
ternational level. For the purpose of this research, I consider democracy as partici-
pation by the concerned persons in a process, which is characterised by transparen-
cy and non-discrimination. 
The notion of democracy in international law cannot clearly be explained in a 
short article dedicated to women’s tribunals. A few remarks are, however, neces-
sary to build the framework of the forthcoming analysis. First, it should be said that 
the concept of democracy was not very common in international scholarship before 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union130. It seemed inappropriate for a community – 
                                                                                                                                         
vestment Arbitration: How to Draw the Line Favorably for the Public Interest, in “Fordham Interna-
tional Law Journal”, 35, 2012, pp. 510-564.  
128 Mark S. Ellis, The Contribution of Non-Governmental Organizations to the Creation of Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunals, in Research Handbook on International Criminal Law, ed. Bartram S. 
Brown, Elgar, Cheltenham 2011, pp. 143-177, p. 163.  
129 William A. Schabas, The UN International Criminal Tribunals. The Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda 
and Sierra Leone, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2006, p. 619.  
130 Gregory H. Fox – Brad R. Roth, Democracy and International Law, in “Review of International 
Studies”, 27, 2011, pp. 327-352; p. 327.  
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the community of States of Westphalian origin – which was characterised by sov-
ereign and independent States. Nonetheless, the principle of democratic legitimacy 
has emerged as one of the most radical changes after the fall of the Berlin Wall. In 
particular, between 1989 and 2010, “domestic governance – understood here in a 
traditional way as the use of public authority at the domestic level through a central 
governmental authority – has been regulated by international law to an unprece-
dented extent, the latter going as far as to prescribe a given type of procedure to ac-
cede to power at the domestic level”131. As early as 1992, an author posited that 
“democracy is on the way to becoming a global entitlement”132.   
Secondly, it should be acknowledged that, given the structure of the internation-
al community, it is difficult to transpose the concept of democracy as developed at 
domestic level into the international realm. As has been pointed out, the interna-
tional community lacks “global demos”133. Nonetheless, it is still possible to find 
elements of democracy in the principles of procedural fairness, in human rights, 
civil liberties, the rule of law, and free elections. These, however, constitute only 
“steps towards democracy, not reliable indicators that democracy has been 
achieved”: what is needed is the recognition in international law of “a principle of 
democratic inclusion”134.  
In recent years, democracy has emerged in the provisions of binding and non-
binding acts that have included extensive mechanisms of civil society participation 
in different fields, such as international environmental law. An illustrative example 
is the Rio Declaration adopted in 1992 according to which “[e]nvironmental issues 
are best handled with the participation of all concerned citisens”135. And even more 
recently, the involvement of civil society has been invoked as a response to the 
lack of transparency which has characterised international organisations and nego-
tiations for multilateral agreements: an aspect which has clearly emerged during 
the negotiations for the Translatlantic Trade Investment Partnership136. 
Against this backdrop, it is possible to appreciate the experience of peoples’ tri-
bunals, and women’s tribunals more specifically. Where the mechanisms provided 
by international law are not sufficient to respond to injustice, peoples’ tribunals fill 
this gap, they are capable of responding to a quest for “real global democracy sus-
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tained by the rule of law”137. This “real global democracy” can be analysed from a 
women’s point of view as a response to discrimination on the basis of gender. I ar-
gue that women’s tribunals are not only a response to impunity and forgetfulness, 
but are also capable of eroding the historically unequal power relations between 
men and women, which are present in all societies and increase in wartime and in 
post-conflict situations.  
 
Conclusions 
The analysis has shown that women’s tribunals, despite being neglected by 
most literature, play an important role in the development of international law. In-
ternational law, especially in the last decades, cannot be simply conceived as the 
law of the “relations” among States. As clearly pointed out by some authors, the 
international legal system is characterised by “an endless constellation and combi-
nation or variety of actors and normative outputs and processes” and is “far more 
malleable than conventionally understood”138. The establishment of new “entities” 
in the realm of the international community, such as the standard-setting bodies, 
which can be defined as “informal” bodies devoid of a mandate enshrined in an in-
ternational treaty, is not new. An example is the Financial Stability Board in the 
field of international finance. Compared to peoples’ tribunals, however, these bod-
ies have a sort of legitimacy – but they are not necessarily “democratic” in the pro-
cedure139 – which derives from the approval by the governments which participate 
in the body.  
Peoples’ and women’s tribunals have been rarely analysed since their authority 
does not stem from a decision taken by governments or international organisations 
and they are considered as not capable of having an impact on international rela-
tions or the judiciary. Nonetheless, I have argued that this approach is quite limited. 
In Guatemala, the Court of Conscience might not have been the direct cause of the 
procedure started before a domestic court, but it has surely determined an increas-
ing awareness of the problem of the violence against indigenous women that oc-
curred during the conflict. The fact that the same association that promoted the 
Court of Conscience then participated in the domestic proceeding is a clear indica-
tion of the impact that civil society can have. Despite not being able to assess indi-
vidual criminal responsibility, peoples’ and women’s tribunals contribute to “build-
ing solidarity and affirming the experiences of those who have suffered human 
rights violations”140, and they “reflect critically on existing legal rules and practices 
in order to foster change”141. 
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Women in Sarajevo were conscious of the fact that they could not oblige gov-
ernments to start new proceedings to get compensation for the abuses suffered dur-
ing and after the conflict in Former Yugoslavia. However, their testimonies will be 
shared and kept as part of the collective memory of the abuses suffered by many 
women142. Furthermore, the material (testimonies, videos, written documents) col-
lected by civil society tribunals could be used by other “formal” international or 
domestic tribunals – for example inquiry commissions or international criminal tri-
bunals – to support further proceedings143. This seems to be a very interesting as-
pect.  
Let us propose an illustrative example in that respect. Considering the current 
situation at the international level, a tribunal dealing with the situation of female 
refugees should be welcomed and the testimonies heard in that context used or at 
least form the basis for further international proceedings and inquiries. This is the 
process started by the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Syria, 
established in 2011 by the Human Rights Council with a mandate to investigate all 
alleged violations of international human rights law occurred since March 2011 in 
the Syrian Arab Republic. The reports issued by the Commission contain some 
parts of the testimonies collected first-hand. Since September 2011, the Commis-
sion has conducted more than 4,500 interviews144. Photographs, video recordings, 
satellite imagery and medical records were collected and analysed. Reports from 
Governments and non-governmental sources, academic analyses and United Na-
tions reports formed part of the investigation145. At the end of the most recent re-
port, the Commission reiterated the findings of a previous report in which it af-
firmed that Daesh had committed genocide against the Yazidis146, and that the case 
should be referred to the International Criminal Court by the UN Security Coun-
cil147. If the case is brought to the attention of the International Criminal Court, the 
judges of this Court could rely on the facts and the testimonies collected by the 
Commission of Inquiry on Syria and – if created – by a peoples’ or women’s tribu-
nal with regard, as in our example, to the situation of female refugees fleeing from 
Syria. In this article, I suggest that the associations that promote peoples’ and 
women’s tribunals should participate as amici curiae in international proceedings, 
presenting their reports. The use of such reports would not overcome the lack of 
legitimacy of peoples’ tribunals under international law, but it would provide them 
with a formal recognition at the international level. In other words, where legiti-
mate international tribunals established by international organisations or States take 
into consideration the testimonies collected by peoples’ and women’s tribunals, 
this would represent a step forward in promoting democracy, which should be also 
conceived, as we have said, as a form of participation in decision-making processes 
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at the international level. In the case of women’s tribunals, they will also contribute 
to eradicating the unequal power relations between men and women, by fighting 
the silence that has often led to impunity.   
 
  
 
